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Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic* 
Abstract: This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric 
Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the 
grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed 
in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s 
Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of 
validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the 
conclusion, and second, that the premises of a proof are actually used to derive the 
conclusion. Turning to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, I argue that there is evidence that 
Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic satisfies both conditions. Moreover, Aristotle at one 
point explicitly addresses the potential harmfulness of syllogisms with unused 
premises. Here, I argue that Aristotle’s analysis allows for a rejection of such 
syllogisms on formal grounds established in the foregoing parts of the Prior 
Analytics. In a final section I consider the view that Aristotle distinguished between 
validity on the one hand and syllogistic validity on the other. Following this line of 
reasoning, Aristotle’s logic might not be a relevance logic, since relevance is part of 
syllogistic validity and not, as modern relevance logic demands, of general validity. I 
argue that the reasons to reject this view are more compelling than the reasons to 
accept it and that we can, cautiously, uphold the result that Aristotle’s logic is a 
relevance logic. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on Aristotle’s Syllogistic of the past 50 years has frequently suggested 
that Aristotle’s logic bears a similarity to modern relevance logic (Burrell 1964; 
Smiley 1973, Thom 1981; Smith 1989; Smiley 1994; Gabbay and Woods 2001; 
Woods 2001; Woods and Irvine 2004; Smith 2007; Striker 2009; Malink 2013).1 
These suggestions range from careful statements like Smith’s (2007; cf. 1989, p. 210), 
according to whom some passages ‘could be […] interpreted as committing Aristotle 
to something like a relevance logic’, to bolder claims like Smiley’s (1994, p. 30), who 
thinks that Aristotle is ‘redolent of relevance’, to assertions such as those of Gabbay 
and Woods, who straightforwardly call Aristotle ‘the first relevant, intuitionistic, non-
                                                
* The first version of this paper was written during a DAAD funded stay at King’s College London and 
has been read at the Philosophisches Kolloquium in Cologne. I am grateful for the helpful remarks I 
received from the participants of this colloquium, especially Nicholas White and Marius Thomann. 
Since then, various versions of the paper have been read by Peter Adamson, Matthew Duncombe, Luca 
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monotonic, hyperconsistent logician’ (2001, p. 144; cf. Woods and Irvine 2004, p. 
66). Given the frequency of this thesis it is surprising to see that there is hardly any 
attempt to give an argument for it. In those rare cases in which an argument is given, 
the analysis is confined to only a few lines of the Aristotelian text. There seems to be, 
therefore, room for a more detailed study of the relation between Aristotle’s 
syllogistic theory and modern relevance logic.  
In order to approach this issue we first have to characterise the notion of 
relevance in modern relevance logic, as well as, and no less importantly, its place in 
the modern theory. To do so I will turn to the most influential work on relevance logic 
to date, A. Anderson and N. Belnap’s 1975 Entailment, still considered the magnum 
opus of the field. Relevance, according to these authors, is a question of the validity 
of arguments, i.e. a question concerning the relation between premises and 
conclusion. Generally speaking, an argument is valid if the conclusion is a logical 
consequence of the premises. Classical propositional logic considers relevance 
between premises and conclusion unimportant for the question whether the 
conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises: an argument is classically valid if 
and only if it is impossible for the conclusion to be false while all the premises are 
true. This is precisely what Anderson and Belnap take issue with: relevance, for them, 
is integral to the question whether something is a logical consequence of something 
else, and, hence, relevance is an essential element of the notion of validity. If, 
therefore, the evaluation of the thesis that Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic (or 
something similar to it) is to turn out positive, it will have to be Aristotle’s notion of 
validity that contains appropriate restrictions on logical consequence. 
Anderson and Belnap understand logical relevance in a particular way. The 
necessity to incorporate relevance into the logical notion of validity, and therefore to 
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incorporate it in a formal way, leads them to suggest two conditions that an argument 
must satisfy in order to be valid: first, the premises and the conclusion have to share 
some non-logical content (in their case, a propositional variable) – this is understood 
to be a necessary condition; secondly, all the premises of an argument must be used in 
order to derive the conclusion – this condition is both necessary and sufficient. Since 
these conditions mark out the notion of relevance in modern relevance logic à la 
Anderson and Belnap it will be of particular interest whether Aristotle’s syllogistic 
imposes similar restrictions or not.  
I should point out two caveats of my paper. First, I will not try to give an 
answer to the interesting question whether Aristotle had the intention or motivation to 
incorporate relevance into his syllogistic. It is true that intention and motivation 
played a role in the historical development of modern relevance logic and it is 
possible that Aristotle, too, set out to fight the irrelevance between premises and 
conclusion he encountered in the arguments of his contemporaries; but all that matters 
for my evaluation of the thesis that Aristotle’s logic shows similarity to modern 
relevance logic is whether his syllogistic contains the aforementioned properties, 
irrespective of whether relevance was an idea he consciously built into his theory or 
not.2 Secondly, I use the term ‘relevance logic’ to denote the core of the logic 
developed by Anderson and Belnap. There might be other concepts of logical 
                                                
2 The development of modern relevance logic happened against the background of a dominant logical 
tradition (called ‘the Official view’ by Anderson and Belnap) that, for Anderson and Belnap, was 
problematic insofar as it took no account of the notion of relevance and that, in particular, sanctioned 
as valid the so-called paradoxes of implication. At the same time, Anderson and Belnap considered 
their intuition that relevance should be a matter of logic to be widely shared: most textbooks on logic, 
they observe, emphasize the importance of relevance in their informal treatments but advocate classical 
validity in their formal treatments; a good example of this is Lemmon (1968). These two factors, 
historically speaking, provided the impetus for the development of relevance logic. Aristotle, on the 
other hand, in all likelihood did not work against a dominant logical tradition, at least not against a 
formalized and generally accepted logic that occupied the position of an ‘Official View’. However, he 
still might have been prompted by the moves of certain Sophists to shield his logic from the dangers of 
irrelevant premises. Cf. Topics VIII.11, in particular 161b24-33 and 162a12-5. 
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relevance and different logics that incorporate these concepts, but I will not consider 
whether other such concepts exist, whether they can be employed in the realm of 
logic, or how these logics are related to the relevance logic of Anderson and Belnap. I 
will focus on the question whether Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic is or is not a 
relevance logic in the sense of Anderson and Belnap and all those who agree with the 
core convictions put forward by them.  
  
The paper has three parts: in the first, I will turn to Anderson and Belnap’s core 
account of relevance. I will briefly present their reasoning for why relevance has to be 
part of the notion of validity as well as the two conditions they propose as capturing 
an appropriate notion of relevance.3 The second part of the paper consists in a detailed 
textual analysis of those parts of the Prior Analytics that, in my view, are most 
promising for revealing comparable properties of the syllogistic. The third part of the 
paper discusses an objection against the claim that Aristotle’s logic is a relevance 
logic. This objection emerges from the claim that Aristotle understood syllogistic 
validity as a subproperty of a more general notion of validity. If this claim is accepted, 
showing that syllogistic validity incorporates validity is not sufficient for showing that 
Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic. For, the objection says, syllogistic validity might 
incorporate relevance, but modern relevance logic demands that relevance be part of 
the notion of validity itself. 
                                                
3 I will not provide a defence of Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic. Given the considerable 
literature on the debate between relevance logicians and advocates of classical as well as of other 
strains of logic, this is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
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2. The concept of relevance in modern relevance logic 
The historical development of modern relevance logic in the 20th century4 is not 
important for the present project and we can base our presentation of the essential 
elements of modern relevance logic entirely on Entailment.5 Anderson and Belnap’s 
starting-point is the observation that, although the millennia-old tradition of logic is 
full of remarks to the effect that relevance between premises and conclusion is of 
importance, classical validity does not account for this and hence sanctions as valid 
some arguments the premises of which have no relevance for the conclusion 
(Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 17). In order to illustrate this observation, they cite 
several arguments like this: ‘Assume that snow is puce. It follows that (or 
consequently, or therefore, or it may validly be inferred that) seven is a prime 
number’ (1975, p. 14; cf. pp. 17-18). Their real test cases, however, are the so-called 
paradoxes of implication.  
Among theses paradoxes6 are, for instance, the following two theorems: 
A→(B→A), and B→(A→A). In classical propositional logic both can be validly 
proven, as can be shown, for instance, by using a system of natural deduction (I 
                                                
4 Important steps after the advent of the classical propositional calculus due to Frege (1879) and 
Whitehead and Russell (1910-1913) include MacColl’s (1908) criticism of the implication connective, 
Lewis’ (1918) proposal of a ‘strict implication’ and Ackermann’s (1956) ‘rigorous implication’. 
5 Anderson and Belnap’s system is not the only one that claims the title of being a relevance logic (cf. 
(Dunn and Restall 2002, pp. 1-2; Priest 2008, pp. 188-220), but since we are only interested in the 
essential ideas and concepts, what we will extract from Entailment will also be true for other members 
of the family of relevance logic (cf. the criteria for membership proposed by Mares and Meyer (2001, 
p. 286). -- I should point out that the focus on the pure implicational fragment in my presentation of 
Anderson and Belnap should not be understood as an affirmation of the view that syllogisms are 
implications (cf. Łukasiewicz 1957; Corcoran 1974a). The aim of this section is to extract the concept 
of relevance employed in the logic of Anderson and Belnap and for that the pure implicational 
fragment is the best choice. 
6 Whether the so-called paradoxes of implication are real paradoxes or not depends on how we 
understand ‘paradox’. Some authors, understanding ‘paradox’ as something that leads to logical 
contradictions, do not think that the paradoxes of implication are real paradoxes because they do not 
lead to logical contradictions, even though they might regard them as highly counter-intuitive and 
possibly problematic for that reason; cf. (Sainsbury 2009, pp. 1-2). 
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follow Anderson and Belnap and use Fitch’s system) with rules preserving validity as 
understood by the classical account7: 
  
The →I rule, used at steps 4 and 5 in both proofs accords with the following 
deduction theorem: if there exists a proof of B on the hypotheses A1,…An, then there 
exists a proof of An→B on the hypotheses A1,…An; and conversely. It is here, 
precisely, where Anderson and Belnap think that the classical view goes astray; 
commenting on the proof of B→(A→A) they say: ‘though our eyes tell us that we 
proved it [i.e. A→A, PS] under the hypothesis B, it is crashingly obvious that we did 
not prove it from B’ (1975, p. 18, italics in the original).  
Of course, classical logicians are not confused by the visual order of such 
proofs – the classical validity of the two theorems cited above can be established by 
truth tables, too; and Anderson and Belnap do not think that classical logicians are 
guilty of such a blunder either. The problem, according to Anderson and Belnap, lies 
much deeper, namely in the account of validity that sanctions the rules used in the 
proofs above, and in particular in the classical understanding of the implication 
connective.8 Logicians of the classical persuasion are not troubled by the fact that 
proofs like the above are possible and in general that the so-called paradoxes of 
implication are valid, for although some might agree that there is a difference between 
                                                
7 A basic set of rules contains: 1) hypothesis introduction (hyp): hypotheses may be introduced at any 
time; 2) repetition (rep): a formerly introduced hypothesis may be repeated in the same proof at any 
time; 3) reiteration (reit): a formerly introduced hypothesis may be repeated in a sub-proof; 4) 
entailment introduction (→I): if a proof concludes B from hypothesis A, an implication A→B may be 
introduced; 5) entailment elimination (→E): given A, B may be deduced from A→B.  
8 The implication connective is, for Anderson and Belnap (1975, pp. 3, 5, 12-13), the ‘heart of logic’, 
because of its most intimate connection to logical consequence. 
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the meaning of ‘implication’ in logic and the meaning of ‘implication’ in natural 
language, they are satisfied with the fact that implication as understood by classical 
logic will never lead from truth to falsity. This, however, is not enough for Anderson 
and Belnap, who call for a stronger relation between antecedent and consequent, a 
relation much closer to the sense that terms like ‘follow’ and ‘imply’ have in natural 
languages like English. This relation does not sanction as valid B→(A→A), i.e. an 
implication whose antecedent is totally irrelevant to the (although necessarily true) 
consequent A→A. This irrelevance becomes immediately obvious when we assign to 
B ‘the cat sleeps’ and to A ‘the universe is infinite’: ‘‘the cat sleeps’ implies that ‘if 
the universe is infinite, then the universe is infinite’’ can be validly proven in classical 
propositional logic, but ‘the cat sleeps’ has no bearing whatsoever on ‘if the universe 
is infinite then the universe is infinite’.  
 It is clear, then, that Anderson and Belnap want – and need – to incorporate 
relevance into the concept of validity, i.e. they are looking for a system ‘for which 
there is provable a deduction theorem to the effect that there exists a proof of B from 
[as opposed to merely under in the sense explicated above, PS] the hypothesis A if 
and only if A→B is provable’ (Anderson and Belnap 1975, p. 19, italics in the 
original). In order to do so, they propose a notion of relevance characterised by two 
conditions: variable-sharing and usage. The principal idea behind the first condition 
is that relevance requires some meaning content common to both premises and 
conclusion. The total lack of commonality between the meaning content of the 
premises and the conclusion and the resulting irrelevance of the premises for the 
conclusion is illustrated in implications like ‘‘the cat sleeps’ implies that ‘if the 
universe is infinite then the universe is infinite’’. Since in propositional logic content 
is carried by the propositional variables, the first condition of relevance, then, states 
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that in any validly provable implication A→B, A and B must share a variable 
(Anderson and Belnap 1975, pp. 32-33). 
 Variable-sharing is merely a necessary condition. The second condition 
suggested by Anderson and Belnap, on the other hand, is both necessary and 
sufficient and it is therefore of greater significance for the understanding of the 
concept of relevance at work. The second condition, which I will call usage, states 
that all the hypotheses of a proof must be used in deriving the conclusion. The 
underlying intuition is that ‘for A to be relevant to B it must be possible to use A in a 
deduction of B’. Anderson and Belnap suggest this is plausible because it is a 
common procedure to check whether the hypotheses in a proof have been used to 
derive the conclusion (Anderson and Belnap 1975, pp. 30-31). In order to understand 
how Anderson and Belnap conceive of this condition and to highlight the effect that 
the condition has for the case of the so-called paradoxes of implication, it is helpful to 
look at its formal instantiation. Anderson and Belnap propose to supplement the 
natural deduction calculus with a technique to keep track of the steps in a proof that 
are actually used; the employment of such a method will rule out those cases in which 
a conclusion is merely established under but not from the given hypotheses, or so 
Anderson and Belnap contend. This technique consists in adding an index number to 
each hypothesis introduced, charging a consequent with the respective number on 
entailment elimination (→E) and discharging it on entailment introduction (→I).9  
                                                
9 More precisely, Anderson and Belnap’s reformed rules of the natural deduction system used before 
are: ‘(1) one may introduce a new hypothesis A{k}, where k should be different from all subscripts on 
hypotheses of proofs to which the new proof is not subordinate; (2) from Aa and A→Bb we may infer 
Ba∪b; (3) from a proof of Ba from the hypothesis A{k} we may infer A→Ba-{k}, provided k is in a; and (4) 
reit and rep retain subscripts (where a,b,c, range over sets of numerals)’ (1975, p. 22). 
 9 
With this technique imposed on the natural deduction calculus, the previous 
deductions of the so-called paradoxes of implication are no longer possible. Consider 
the following proofs: 
The left-hand side proof fails at step 4 (and for the same reason at step 5) for the 
introduction of the entailment B→A is not sanctioned by the entailment-introduction 
rule: you may only introduce an entailment if the antecedent’s set of tracking-
numerals contains the consequent’s set of tracking-numerals, which here is not the 
case. The right-hand side proof fails for the same reason, but only at step 5; the 
introduction of the entailment A→A is acceptable and the tracking-numbers at this 
point are completely purged; the next step, then, fails again because of rule (3) stating 
that k must be in a. The idea that in a valid proof all of the hypotheses have been used 
has its formal equivalent in the complete disappearance of the tracking numerals (for, 
the respective numerals get discharged, precisely, on usage); to illustrate this, I have 
reproduced the proof of the law of assertion that Anderson and Belnap (1975, p. 22) 
offer: 
 
 This brief presentation of the core idea of relevance logic à la Anderson and 
Belnap and its basic implementation can be summarized as follows. Against the 
supposition that relevance is a concept too vague to be formalized, Anderson and 
Belnap propose two conditions to capture this concept: (1) as a necessary condition, 
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the set of premises and the conclusion share at least one variable and hence some 
meaning content, and (2) as a necessary and sufficient condition, all the premises of a 
proof are used to deduce the conclusion. Of course, since the second condition is 
necessary and sufficient, it makes the first condition redundant as far as the 
enforcement of relevance is concerned: if the second condition is satisfied, the first 
condition will be satisfied as well. But although the first condition loses its 
significance for producing the desired effect, it is still important to elucidate the 
concept of relevance: necessary conditions always help us to understand the things 
whose conditions they are.10 Most fundamentally, moreover, Anderson and Belnap 
argue that (3) relevance is part of the notion of validity.11 I will now turn to Aristotle’s 
investigation of the syllogism in order to determine whether or not these three 
conditions are, completely or to a degree, present in this theory. 
3. Relevance in Aristotle’s Syllogistic 
A concept of logical relevance allegedly similar to that just presented has been spotted 
in various passages in the Aristotelian corpus by different authors. The suggestions 
include Aristotle’s definition of the syllogism in I.1 of the Prior Analytics (in 
particular in the definition’s requirement that the conclusion has to come about 
‘because of’ (dia) the premises and ‘from their being such’ (tōi tauta einai) (Smith 
2007)), and chapter I.23 (especially 40b30-41a20 (Smiley 1994, p. 30)), chapter I.25 
(Woods 2001, p. 81; Woods and Irvine 2004, p. 65), as well as chapter II.17 
(especially 65b9-12 and 65b21-32 (Smith 1989, pp. 210-11)) of the same work. It will 
be the task of this section to evaluate these passages with an eye to determining 
                                                
10 When we turn to Aristotle’s investigation of the syllogism we will see that he too first argues for a 
condition equivalent to variable-sharing and then turns to the question whether or not a valid syllogism 
requires that all the terms and premises are used. 
11 For a similar set of conditions for relevance logic, cf. Mares and Meyer (2001, p. 286).  
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whether the three conditions of relevance logic that we have set out above are present, 
i.e. whether the concept of relevance employed satisfies the meaning content and the 
usage conditions, as well as whether these conditions are imposed as restrictions on 
the validity of syllogisms. 
The requirement that relevance is a matter of validity presents us with a 
number of difficulties, which we must first address. To begin with, discussing 
Aristotle’s notion of validity is problematic for terminological reasons. Aristotle did 
not have a designated word or phrase to express the concept of validity; hence, we 
have to look for passages in which Aristotle describes the concept of logical 
consequence and from these passages construct the notion of validity that he 
employed.12 Some commentators have suggested that the word sullogismos itself (in 
its more specific logical sense13) carries with it the notion of validity; every syllogism 
would then be valid and the phrase ‘invalid syllogism’ would be a contradiction in 
terms (Smith 2007). This view is to some degree plausible because Aristotle, in his 
investigation of the figures (e.g. I.4, 26a7-8), expresses what we would call invalidity 
by saying ‘there will be no syllogism’ (ouk estai sullogismos). Thus, the definition of 
syllogism that Aristotle provides at the beginning of the Prior Analytics suggests 
itself as a point of departure for the investigation of Aristotle’s concept of validity. 
However, this definition is of a very general nature and will need to be supplemented 
and spelled out by subsequent passages.  
Secondly, certain elements of Aristotle’s theory have given rise to the question 
whether the syllogistic stands in need of an underlying propositional logic 
                                                
12 Of special interest in this context are passages in which Aristotle uses expressions such as ‘ex 
anagkēs sumbainei’, ‘ei X, anagkē Y’ or simply the word ‘anagkaion’. 
13 Syllogismos can, of course, just mean ‘argument’ or ‘reasoning’ in an everyday sense (Liddell et al. 
1996, ad loc.) besides its technical logical meaning, which we could translate as ‘deduction’. I will use 
the word ‘syllogism’ in its technical meaning, i.e. as a technical term of logic as contrasted with an 
everyday use of the word ‘argument’ throughout the paper and disambiguate when necessary. 
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(Łukasiewicz 1957, pp. 49; Rose 1968, pp. 53; Patzig 1968, ch. 5; Corcoran 1974b, 
pp. 92-93; Slater 1979), for example the so-called conversions Aristotle introduces in 
I.2, the reduction of imperfect syllogisms to perfect syllogisms that make use of these 
conversions and, thirdly, the hypothetical syllogism (cf. (Lear 1980, pp. 34-53)). As 
far as the present project is concerned, the possibility that Aristotle’s syllogistic 
requires an underlying propositional logic could lead to the following objection: if the 
syllogistic requires an underlying propositional logic, and if relevance – in the 
syllogistic – is ensured through (structural) features of the syllogism, then it appears 
that there is an element of Aristotle’s logic, namely the underlying propositional 
logic, for which it has not been shown that it observes relevance-conditions.  
To be sure, those interpretations that affirm that the syllogistic requires an 
underlying propositional logic have been met by forceful arguments to the contrary 
(Corcoran 1974b; Smiley 1973). The really pressing question for the present paper, 
however, is not whether or not the syllogistic requires an underlying propositional 
logic, but whether or not Aristotle accepted arguments as valid that are not 
syllogisms. For, even if the syllogistic does not require an underlying non-syllogistic 
logic, the acceptance of non-syllogistic arguments has important consequences for the 
notion of validity we can ascribe to Aristotle. Two views have been advanced 
regarding this issue. The first view (I will refer to this as the A-view) says that 
Aristotle’s notion of validity is different from his notion of syllogistic validity 
(henceforth s-validity).14 The former is an unanalysed primitive, the latter a proper 
subproperty of validity. S-validity, the proponents of the A-view agree, might be 
constrained by conditions of relevance, but at the same time validity, its 
superproperty, might not. Therefore, showing that s-validity displays good 
                                                
14 This has been claimed by, for instance, Frede (1974) and Woods (2001). 
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approximations to the conditions upheld in modern relevance logic is not sufficient 
for the claim that it is a relevance logic, for, as we have seen in the discussion of 
Anderson and Belnap, modern relevance logic requires that relevance is a part of 
validity. According to the other view (henceforth the B-view), Aristotle regarded ‘the 
theory of syllogistic as the most fundamental sort of reasoning’ (Corcoran 1974b, p. 
97). According to the B-view, validity is identical with s-validity and Aristotle’s 
theory of formal consequence, his logic, is identical with the syllogistic. This, 
evidently, would allow us to draw much more far-reaching conclusions about the 
relation between the syllogistic and modern relevance logic. 
Although it is clear that the question whether the A- or the B-view should be 
given precedence is instrumental for the question this paper tries to answer, the 
considerations and arguments put forward in what follows remain, I think, valuable 
even if it should turn out that there is more convincing evidence for the A-view. First, 
if Aristotle really accepted a notion of validity different from that of s-validity, it is 
still an interesting and important question whether and how precisely relevance is 
ensured within the theory of the syllogism. Secondly, investigating the syllogistic 
from the viewpoint of relevance contributes to distinguishing between two different 
versions of the A-view; whichever of these two versions one embraces also has 
consequences for the question whether Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic or not. 
Some authors merely claim that Aristotle accepted arguments different from 
syllogisms as formally valid without specifying in detail what this validity amounts to 
(e.g. Frede 1974). In this version of the A-view, it is still possible that Aristotle’s 
logic is a relevance logic: if the subproperty s-validity incorporates relevance, its 
superproperty might also incorporate relevance (although the latter does not follow 
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from the former).15 If, on the other hand, it turns out that s-validity does not 
incorporate relevance, then surely its superproperty will not incorporate relevance; 
this result could then be seen as support for the second version of the A-view whose 
proponents hold that the superproperty validity must be classical validity (e.g. Woods 
2004).  
Since, then, the question whether the syllogistic incorporates relevance is of 
interest independently of whether the A- or the B-view should be given precedence, I 
will first analyse the theory of the syllogism and in particular s-validity. I will then 
consider the arguments for and against the A- and the B-view, respectively. If it turns 
out that s-validity incorporates relevance, and if it turns out that there is stronger 
evidence for the B-view (i.e. that s-validity, for Aristotle, is validity), then we can 
proceed to draw the conclusion that Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic à la 
Anderson and Belnap. If, on the other hand, the evidence for the A-view is stronger, 
then we cannot conclude this, but only that s-validity incorporates relevance and that 
validity might incorporate it. 
 
The first step in our search for relevance-properties in Aristotle’s syllogistic is 
to take account of his definition or characterisation of the syllogism in Prior Analytics 
I.1: 
  
A syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things being stated (tethentōn 
tinōn), something other than what was supposed (tōn keimenōn) follows of 
                                                
15 I will argue that the way in which syllogisms enforce relevance is peculiar to syllogistic form. The 
superproperty validity, applying to arguments different from syllogisms, cannot therefore incorporate 
relevance in the same way. This, however, does not prevent validity from being relevant, as one kind of 
logic might incorporate the concept of relevance in a way appropriate to that logic, while another kind 
of logic might have to take a different route to ensure that the same concept is part of its notion of 
validity. Consider, for instance, the case of a relevant predicate logic; cf. (Dunn 1987; Anderson et al. 
1992, §74). 
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necessity (ex anagkēs sumbainei) from their being so (tōi tauta einai). By 
‘from their being so’, I mean ‘follow in virtue of them’ (dia tauta 
sumbainein), and by ‘follow in virtue of them’ I mean ‘needing no further 
term from outside’ (mēdenos exothen horou prosdein) in order for the 
necessity to come about (to genesthai to anagkaion). (24b19-22) 
 
Apart from the idea already referred to, namely that the term sullogismos itself seems 
to carry the notion of (s-)validity within it, the text of the definition gives us a further 
reason to accept it as a statement about (s-)validity inasmuch as it clearly concerns 
consequence (ex anagkēs sumbainei), and, more precisely, logical consequence, as is 
clear by the definition’s mention of assumptions and statements (tethentōn tinōn, tōn 
keimenōn). 
 Smith (2007) suggested we understand the phrase ‘from their being so’ (tōi 
tauta einai) as an indication that the syllogistic incorporates a notion of relevance. 
Aristotle explains this part of the definition with two subsequent statements. The first 
explicates the dative of tōi tauta as a causal dative, ‘in virtue of’ (dia); the second 
explains ‘in virtue of them’ to mean that ‘no other terms from outside’ need to be 
introduced in order to ‘bring the necessity about’. Taken at face value, Aristotle seems 
to say no more than that if the premises feature the terms A, B and C, then the 
deduction of the conclusion may not rely on a term D, though it might rely on 
additional logical machinery. This, of course, is very general and will need to be 
explicated further. But we may note that from the text of this passage alone we cannot 
conclude that Aristotle demands that the terms of the premises have to be used, nor 
that the conclusion and the premises have to share terms. Consider, for instance, the 
following argument: 
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    Premise 1: All A is A 
    Premise 2: All B is B 
    Conclusion: All C is C 
Would this argument be s-valid if we restrict ourselves to the definition quoted above 
as Aristotle’s account of s-validity? It is a discourse and it satisfies the condition that 
the conclusion is ‘something other than what has been assumed’.16 Whether the 
condition, which states that the conclusion follows necessarily, is satisfied, depends 
on how we understand ex anagkēs sumbainei. Within the classical framework, we 
would say that the conclusion does indeed follow necessarily; for, since it is 
impossible that the conclusion is false while all the premises are true, the argument is 
classically valid. Something similar could be said regarding the dia tauta condition. 
Interpreted from a classical viewpoint, the validity of the argument depends – at least 
partly – on the premises (is valid because of them, dia tauta); for, since the premises 
are true and the conclusion is true, the argument is valid.17 Hence, the text of the 
definition as it stands cannot decide the question whether the syllogistic is a relevance 
logic, because the answer to this question depends, precisely, on how we interpret the 
conditions of the definition. Aristotle’s subsequent discussion of s-validity will have 
to explicate the definition in order for us to be able to determine whether it 
incorporates a concept of relevance or not. 
                                                
16 It is, however, unclear whether the individual statements are well-formed. Aristotle’s remarks on the 
form of premises up to this point of the Prior Analytics do not expressly forbid statements such as ‘All 
A is A’ (cf. 24a16-7 and footnote 19). In my view, Aristotle ultimately rejects such statements, but this 
question does not affect my point here. See (Corcoran 1974b, pp. 96 and 99). 
17 In this particular example, since the conclusion is necessarily true, one could say that the validity 
does not depend on the particular premises used. But even if this is not the case, it becomes obvious 
that the validity depends (partly) on the premises, for an argument may never lead from truth to falsity. 
Hence, if we have an argument with a false conclusion, its validity depends on the falsity of its 
premises and therefore its validity could be said, from a classical viewpoint, to be dia tauta the 
premises. 
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 After the first chapter in which, in addition to the definition of the syllogism, 
Aristotle defines other fundamental terms like ‘proposition’ (protasis), ‘term’ (horon), 
‘perfect’ (teleion) and ‘imperfect’ (atelē) syllogism, the Prior Analytics proceed thus: 
in the second and third chapter, Aristotle introduces conversions, the fourth chapter is 
dedicated to showing which moods of the first figure are s-valid and which are s-
invalid, the fifth and sixth chapter do the same with the second and third figures, 
respectively. The seventh chapter begins to draw general conclusions of, as we would 
say, a metalogical character, which are continued in chapters 23 and 25, interrupted 
by the discussion of modal syllogisms in chapters 8-22. Chapters four to seven and 23 
and 25 are therefore the most likely to contain important material for the present 
study. 
 Aristotle begins his investigation of the moods by assuming that a syllogism 
(i) relates three distinct terms that are distributed over two premises and one 
conclusion, such that (ii) a premise relates two distinct terms, (iii) a premise is not 
repeated, (iv) one term appears in two premises and (v) the conclusion relates the two 
non-repeating terms from the first and the second premise.18 If a syllogism is 
constructed from exactly three distinct terms, exactly two premises and one 
conclusion, exactly one middle term, and also satisfies the other conditions, I will call 
it a minimal syllogism, for reasons that will become apparent later. Likewise it will 
become clear later that there is another kind of valid syllogism that satisfies the five 
conditions, but contains more terms and premises than the minimal syllogism. The 
relation between minimal and non-minimal syllogisms is, as we will see, of crucial 
importance to the question of relevance.  
                                                
18 Aristotle does not state these conditions explicitly. As a matter of fact, he investigates premise-pairs; 
but from his actual responses to a particular premise-pair we see that he also has certain conditions in 
mind relating to the conclusions (e.g. he does not consider syllogisms of the form: all A is B, all B is C, 
therefore all D is E.) 
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In chapters 4-6, Aristotle systematically investigates all syllogisms that can be 
formed in compliance with the definition of a minimal syllogism by forming all 
possible premise-pairs according to his stipulations of the form of a proposition and 
he considers whether a conclusion necessarily follows.19 Each individual pair of 
premises receives one of three possible responses: either Aristotle states that the mood 
is evidently s-valid (for the perfect moods of the first figure), or he proceeds to prove 
the s-validity (for the imperfect moods) or he employs a countermodel-technique to 
show the mood’s s-invalidity. Aristotle’s proofs of the imperfect moods depend on the 
perfect moods and on the conversions and can either be direct or take the form of a 
reductio argument or involve ekthesis.20  
In chapter 7, Aristotle demonstrates that all valid syllogisms are shown to be 
valid by means of the first figure and indeed that it is possible to show that all valid 
syllogisms, even the two perfect particular ones (Darii and Ferio), can be led back or 
be reduced to (anagagein eis) the two universal moods of the first figure, i.e. Barbara 
and Celarent. We note that the set of valid syllogisms Aristotle is investigating in I.4-
6 (and indeed also those shown to be invalid), satisfy a condition equivalent to 
variable-sharing (i.e. Anderson and Belnap’s necessary condition) per definitionem, 
if, as is plausible, meaning content in a term logic such as the syllogistic is captured 
by the terms (since Aristotle uses letters to stand for terms, I will call this condition 
letter-sharing21). For, one of the implicit defining conditions of the set is that the 
                                                
19 Aristotle, in I.1, 24a16-b12, stipulates that the propositions that serve either as premises or as 
conclusion have to be statements that affirm or deny something of something (tinos kata tinos) either 
universally (katholou) or particularly (kata meros). The phrase tinos kata tinos does not preclude self-
predications, but since it is very likely that we can ignore this case, the different kinds of statements 
that are possible are: universal affirmative (All A is B), universal negative (No A is B), particular 
affirmative (Some A is B), and particular negative (Some A is not B). 
20 It has been argued that the proofs of the s-validity of the imperfect moods require a logic of 
propositions. For a rebuttal of this claim, see Corcoran (1974b); also see Patzig (1968, ch. 5). 
21 There is a dispute over the question whether Aristotle’s letters are variables or not. Łukasiewicz 
(1957, pp. 7-8), Corcoran (1974b, p. 100), and others believe that they are variables; Barnes (2012, p. 
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terms are distributed such that the terms forming the conclusion are also part of the 
premises. If it were possible to show that non-minimal valid syllogisms are valid 
because of valid minimal syllogisms, and if it were further possible to show that there 
are no other valid syllogisms apart from valid minimal syllogisms and those non-
minimal syllogisms that are valid because of minimal syllogisms, then the syllogism 
as such could be said to satisfy the letter-sharing condition. Of course, this is merely a 
necessary condition and, hence, we do not have to be concerned that the syllogisms of 
the initial set shown to be invalid also satisfy this condition. Further, it will be 
necessary to show that the usage condition is satisfied as well. Here the question will 
arise whether Aristotle thinks that this condition, if it applies, is a necessary and 
sufficient condition, like in Anderson and Belnap, or just a necessary condition.  
We will have to consider, therefore, whether the Prior Analytics contains 
arguments that show (i) that all non-minimal valid syllogisms are valid because of 
valid minimal syllogisms, and (ii) that there are no other valid syllogisms apart from 
valid minimal syllogisms and those non-minimal syllogisms that are valid because of 
valid minimal syllogisms. If (i) and (ii) can be established, it follows that the letter-
sharing property that was satisfied by the minimal syllogism because of its structural 
requirements (number of terms and premises, distribution of terms) will also be true 
for those non-minimal syllogisms that are valid because of minimal syllogisms. We 
must also consider whether (iii) an argument can be found that establishes that valid 
minimal syllogisms satisfy the usage-condition, and if so whether this condition is 
understood as necessary only or as both necessary and sufficient.  
                                                                                                                                      
99, n. 139), Frede (1974, p. 19) and others believe that they are not or that it is at least questionable 
whether they are. Cf. also Kirwan (1978, pp. 3-8) and Barnes (2007, pp. 337-59).  
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Chapters I.23 and I.25 contain arguments that can be interpreted as 
establishing or at least beginning to establish all three points. In chapter 23, Aristotle 
argues that the structure of the minimal syllogism is a necessary condition for its s-
validity by showing that a syllogism needs at least two distinct premises and at least 
three distinct terms; further, he argues that syllogisms are in need of a middle term, 
i.e. a term appearing in both premises. From these results he concludes that all 
syllogisms that can be generated with a view to these conditions are those considered 
in the initial set, i.e. the set he considers in I.4-6. 
 In chapter 25, Aristotle argues that there is no conclusion that could not be 
derived from exactly two premises (or exactly three terms), which are structured in 
the way he argued they must be in chapter 23, by showing that whenever a conclusion 
seems to require more than two premises (or three terms), we are either dealing with 
several syllogisms or that the conclusion can be deduced from just two of the 
premises that were supposed to be necessary to deduce the conclusion. The arguments 
of chapters 23 and 25 will allow us to draw some conclusions concerning the letter-
sharing and usage conditions, but only for those syllogisms considered in the initial 
set, not for syllogisms with more premises and terms. It seems, however, that the 
purpose of Aristotle’s arguments in I.23 and I.25 is also to show that valid finite 
arbitrarily long syllogisms can be analysed into valid minimal syllogisms and that 
invalid finite arbitrarily long syllogisms cannot be analysed into valid minimal 
syllogisms. If we understand this as a requirement (i.e. that a non-minimal syllogism 
is valid if and only if it can be analysed into valid minimal syllogisms), then our 
conclusions can be interpreted as affecting the notion of s-validity itself. 
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I will turn, then, to I.23. After stating that the conclusion of every syllogism 
must be a statement in which an attribute is said to belong (or not to belong) in the 
universal (or in the particular) sense to some subject, and that the proof of this must 
be either direct or indirect, Aristotle advances the following argument about direct 
proofs (40b30-41a20). If we suppose that the conclusion of an argument is AB,22 then 
it is necessary to assume something from which this conclusion is supposed to follow; 
for otherwise, we clearly have no argument at all, but just a statement. If we assume 
that AB follows from a premise that states AB, then, Aristotle says, ‘the initial thing 
will have been taken’ (40b32-3). The argument under consideration, thus, is AB ⊦ 
AB. An argument of the form Π ⊦ Π is, of course, circular, and although circular 
arguments may be rejected for several reasons, they are generally considered to be 
logically valid.23 However, if we take into consideration the definition of the 
syllogism, we have reason to believe that Aristotle is here saying that circular 
arguments are at least not s-valid, for the definition states that in a syllogism 
‘something other than (heteron ti) what was supposed’ follows and this is evidently 
not the case in circular arguments.24  
The next case Aristotle considers is that AC is taken as a premise, but that 
nothing is assumed to apply to either A or C (i.e. there is no further premise AX or 
CX). The proposed argument is, then, AC ⊦ AB. Again, Aristotle says that ‘there will 
                                                
22 In what follows, I will use different notations depending on the purpose of the argument as well as to 
stay as close to Aristotle’s text as possible. In Aristotle, letters can stand either for propositions or for 
the terms the propositions relate to each other. In my notation, Latin uppercase letters always stand for 
terms and I will usually indicate the kind of relation that obtains between two such terms, designated 
by the Latin lowercase letters a, e, i, and o (see footnote 19). I will use lowercase x as a variable 
ranging over these letters, hence AxB is either AaB, AeB, AiB, or AoB. I may also omit the x and 
write AB when it is of no importance whether the statement is AxB or BxA. Greek uppercase letters, 
on the other hand, stand for the propositions that can occupy premise- or conclusion-position in an 
argument: Π, Ψ ⊦ Θ can stand, e.g., for AxB, BxC, AxC. 
23 Circular arguments are classically valid; in the field of relevance logic, there are some systems in 
which circular arguments are also valid and some in which they are not. Cf. Mares (2012). 
24 At any rate, the idea that in a circular argument no deduction has taken place might be thought to be 
an intuitive judgment.  
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be no syllogism’. Explaining this passage, Alexander of Aphrodisias refers to the 
definition of the syllogism and in particular to the plural ‘certain things being stated’ 
which he takes as a demand for more than one premise and hence as grounds to rule 
out AC ⊦ AB.25 However, Aristotle’s own explanation (gar, 40b35) is that in such a 
case ‘nothing will follow of necessity’; thus, Aristotle might indeed be referring to the 
definition, but to a part different from the one Alexander suggests.26 We would have, 
then, the following argument: since every syllogism necessitates a conclusion and 
since no conclusion is necessitated by the premise AC, an argument that only has AC 
as a premise is not a syllogism.  
But why is it that in the case under consideration nothing follows of necessity? 
One way to make sense of Aristotle’s remark is to understand it against the 
background of the countermodel-technique I mentioned before, for when Aristotle 
first employs countermodels, it is precisely with the aim of showing a lack of 
necessitation. The first mood Aristotle shows to be invalid in his analysis of the 
figures is characterized by the premise-set AaB, BeC. Assuming these premises, ‘no 
conclusion follows necessarily from their being so’ (26a4-5). In order to establish this 
claim, Aristotle proceeds to show that the premise-pair AaB, BeC allows for term-
substitution such that the conclusion could be either an a- or an e-statement: the first 
would be the case if the three terms that are related in the syllogism are animal, man 
and horse; the latter would be the case if the three terms are animal, man and stone.  
                                                
25 Alexander, in APr., 257.8-13. Smith (1989, p. 140) thinks that this might be the best explanation we 
can get. 
26 Of course, the two parts might not be independent of each other. In fact, it is precisely Aristotle’s 
aim in this passage to show that if only one premise is assumed, there will be no syllogism. If we 
follow Alexander, we have to accept that syllogisms are multi-premised because of Aristotle’s 
stipulation in the definition of the syllogism. Aristotle’s own explanation, however, indicates that the 
demand that syllogisms have to be multi-premised is a consequence of the demand that syllogisms 
necessitate a conclusion. Also see section 4 below on how this passage relates to the question whether 
or not Aristotle accepted a validity different from s-validity. 
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This alone might be enough to show that no conclusion is necessitated if we 
have a premise-pair AaB, BeC, but it is possible to prove this more formally, as 
Patzig does. Patzig first gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a premise-pair 
(p) to belong to the class of pairs from which a conclusion can be s-validly deduced 
(P): p∊P↔[(A, B, C) (p→AaC) or (A, B, C) (p→AeC) or (A, B, C) (p→AiC) or (A, 
B, C) (p→AoC)]. On the other hand, pairs that belong to the class from which no 
conclusion can be s-validly deduced (I) are characterized by the negation of this 
expression; hence, membership to this class is defined thus: p∊I↔ [(∃A, B, C) 
(p&AoC) and (∃A, B, C) (p&AiC) and (∃A, B, C) (p&AeC) and (∃A, B, C) 
(p&AaC)]. Patzig then shows that in order to prove that p is a member of I all that has 
to be done is to give a triad that makes p and AaC true and a different triad that makes 
p and AeC true, which is exactly what Aristotle does. For, if AaC is true, AiC is also 
true, and if AeC is true, AoC is true (Patzig 1968, pp. 175-176). Returning to 
Aristotle’s analysis in I.23, we can now apply a similar method to the argument under 
consideration, AC ⊦ AB. AC is the sole member of our premise-set p and AB is the 
conclusion. It is easy to see that we can find term-triads that make p and AaB as well 
as p and AeB true, and hence also p and AiB and p and AeB. Hence, AC ⊦ AB lacks 
the required necessity and Aristotle’s intermediary result is, therefore, that we need to 
assume at least one more premise. 
The case he considers next is the following: we assume another premise in 
addition to AC and this premise is either AX or CX; in this case we can indeed get a 
conclusion (namely, either CX or AX), but it will not be the conclusion we sought, 
AB. Aristotle again simply states that no conclusion AB can be deduced in this case, 
and again we could refer to the explanation based on a lack of necessitation, given 
above. The consequence of the consideration of these cases is that we need a premise 
 24 
that contains the term B; if we continue to think of the first premise of our syllogism 
as AC, and AB as the desired conclusion, then the second premise has to be CB, so 
that we get to AC, CB ⊦ AB. This is a major result of Aristotle’s argument and he 
proceeds to formulate27 it as a general (holos) theorem: ‘we will never have a 
syllogism proving that one thing applies to another if we do not assume a middle, 
which is related in some way by predication to each of the other two.’ (41a2-4) Thus, 
Aristotle here states that a middle term is necessary.  
Aristotle draws the following conclusion from the whole argument: since a 
middle term is required in any valid syllogism, and since there are only three ways of 
forming a syllogism with two premises, one conclusion and three distinct terms, such 
that it fulfils the requirements the argument has revealed, it follows that every (panta) 
valid syllogism is brought about by one of the three figures (41a13-8). For, the three 
possibilities to form a syllogism with two premises and three distinct terms with one 
term appearing in both premises are: (i) predicating A of B and B of C (i.e. the first 
figure) or (ii) A of B and A of C (the second figure) or (iii) A of C and B of C (the 
third figure). Hence, what before was true only per definitionem, namely that the 
syllogisms considered in I.4-6 all satisfied the letter-sharing condition, is now 
supported by an argument: there are no valid syllogisms that do not at least consist of 
two premises and one conclusion with three distinct terms; one of these terms appears 
in both premises, while the conclusion consists of the two remaining terms; hence, 
letter-sharing is indeed a necessary condition of the validity of minimal syllogisms. 
Indeed, Aristotle’s argument allows us to make a more general claim: since it has 
                                                
27 Ross reads eipomen, which would imply that Aristotle has already stated such a theorem (Ross 
(1949, p. 371) thinks it is implicitly stated in I.4-6). But since this is really the conclusion of the 
argument Aristotle has just presented, reading eipōmen with the first hand of ms. A and ms. B, as Ebert 
and Nortmann (2007, p. 742 n. 1) suggest, seems to make more sense. Aristotle’s explanation (gar) 
immediately following the theorem seems to do no more than summarize the steps of the argument he 
has just given. 
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been shown that no conclusion can be deduced at all if a syllogism does not satisfy 
certain requirements concerning the number and distribution of terms, even a 
syllogism with more terms and premises than the minimal syllogism will satisfy the 
letter-sharing condition. For, the letter-sharing condition is satisfied if at least one 
letter is shared by both premise-set and conclusion. 
 In my view, this result also allows us to draw a preliminary conclusion 
concerning the usage condition. Aristotle has stated that one premise is never enough 
to derive a conclusion and I have suggested that we should understand this claim 
against the background of his countermodel-technique. Now, if one premise is not 
enough to derive a conclusion, it stands to reason that in a two-premise syllogism both 
premises have to be actually used. When we turn to chapter II.17 we will see 
candidates of syllogisms of this form: AB, BC, CD ⊦ BD, a syllogism in which 
arguably the premise AB is not used and which could be restated as BC, CD ⊦ BD. 
Now, if a similar syllogism could be formed with just two premises (i.e. a two-
premise syllogism in which only one premise is actually used), we could restate the 
syllogism as having only one premise, but Aristotle has just concluded that this is not 
possible. Hence, it appears that both premises in a minimal syllogism contribute 
crucially to the deduction of the conclusion and that, therefore, the argument in I.23 
also seems to contribute to a proof that usage is at least a necessary condition for the 
validity of syllogisms.28 
But at this point usage is not completely established as a necessary condition. 
This would only be the case if Aristotle held that the only valid syllogisms are those 
with the structural requirements of minimal syllogisms. But since it is beyond doubt 
                                                
28 In the argument I have presented, Aristotle only considers direct arguments. He then (41a21-b5) adds 
an argument to show that the same applies to reductio arguments, which I will not present here. 
 26 
that he accepts arguments with more premises than two, we cannot yet decide whether 
usage is a necessary condition of s-validity. However, if Aristotle were to show that 
finite arbitrarily long syllogisms are valid if and only if they can be analysed into 
minimal syllogisms, it seems that we could draw such a conclusion.  
I believe that I.23 and I.25 contain arguments that can be understood as 
entailing such a reductive claim. Chapter 23 establishes that the structural features of 
minimal syllogisms are necessary for a deduction to come about; chapter 25 argues 
that there are no conclusions that require more premises or terms than the minimal 
syllogism requires. The purpose of these chapters cannot be to establish the validity of 
the syllogisms accepted as valid in I.4-6, for, in Aristotle’s view, this part of the 
project has been completed. What is missing, however, is an answer to the question: 
which of those arguments are s-valid that have more premises and terms than minimal 
syllogisms? If Aristotle succeeds in showing that there are no conclusions requiring 
more premises (or terms) than minimal syllogisms, and since he has already shown 
that syllogisms at least have to satisfy the structural features minimal syllogisms 
satisfy, he can then argue that finite arbitrarily long syllogisms can be analysed into 
syllogisms of the minimal type; for, if the latter were not the case, a contradiction 
with the results of either I.23 or I.25 would arise. If, moreover, analysability into 
minimal syllogisms is understood as a requirement for the validity of non-minimal 
syllogisms, then we are allowed to extend the claim concerning the status of the usage 
condition from syllogisms of the minimal type to syllogisms in general.  
 
Aristotle has shown in I.23 that none of the terms of the premises are 
dispensable for a given conclusion to come about, but it is still open to question 
whether a syllogism requires more than three terms or more than two premises for its 
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conclusion to come about. Chapter 25 takes up this question and announces at the 
beginning that ‘it is clear also that every (pasa) demonstration will come about 
through three terms and no more’ (41b36-7).29 Aristotle first distinguishes two 
examples, in which a deduction seems to require more than three terms: (i) Π, Ψ ⊦ Θ 
and Γ, Δ ⊦ Θ; (ii) Δ, Θ ⊦ Π and Φ, Σ ⊦ Ψ and Π, Ψ ⊦ Θ.30 In case (i) the conclusion Θ 
comes about both through Π and Ψ as well as through Γ and Δ; but this, Aristotle 
explains, is not one syllogism, but several and, hence, his thesis that a deduction 
requires no more than three terms is not affected. The same is true for case (ii), in 
which the premises for the proof Π, Ψ ⊦ Θ are themselves proven by two further 
syllogisms with the premises Δ and Θ or Φ and Σ, respectively. Obviously, we again 
have several syllogisms and not one. Then, Aristotle goes on to consider an assumed 
syllogism of the form Π, Ψ, Γ, Δ ⊦ Θ. He will systematically investigate this 
syllogism by differentiating several cases and answering each of them either by (a) 
asserting that we deal with a case like (i) above, i.e. that the same conclusion can 
come about through different middle terms and that, hence, we deal with several 
syllogisms; or (b) by asserting that we deal with a case like (ii) above, i.e. the 
premises are themselves proven from other premises and that again we are dealing 
with several syllogisms; or (c) by asserting that a proposition will be concluded that is 
neither Π, Ψ, Γ, Δ or Θ and that, hence, we have several syllogisms that are 
                                                
29 Aristotle’s formulation of the theorem to be established in this chapter demands a short explanation.  
Given the undeniable fact that Aristotle allows for syllogisms with more than two premises, we should 
not understand the theorem to say that there will be no syllogisms with more than two premises, but 
rather that there are no deductions (in the sense of the conclusion, i.e. the result, of a syllogism) which 
require more than two premises: any given conclusion, the theorem says, can be stated as the 
conclusion of a syllogisms with two premises and no more. The occurrence of the word apodeixis 
(demonstration) instead of sullogismos is curious but should not give rise to any concerns about the 
theorem: Aristotle will talk of sullogismoi in the remainder of the chapter and in any case he has stated 
before that every demonstration is a syllogism (but not vice versa), so the result of his discussion will 
apply to syllogisms. 
30 In I.25 the letters stand for syllogistic statements (i.e. propositions), so either for a premise or for a 
conclusion. For the notation, see footnote 22. 
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unconnected; or (d) by asserting that a pair of premises will not yield any conclusion 
and, hence, that we either have no syllogism at all, or one syllogism and some 
remaining statements that are not related to it. For the sake of brevity, and since it is 
generally accepted that this part of Aristotle’s proof is successful in showing that if Θ 
is a conclusion, then the syllogism, which has Θ as a conclusion requires only three 
terms and two premises, I will not reproduce the details.31  
The question that is decisive for our purposes, however, is whether the 
argument Π, Ψ, Γ, Δ ⊦ Θ is s-valid if, in fact, Θ follows from Π and Ψ alone. It has 
been remarked in the scholarly literature on this chapter that here Aristotle comes 
close to explicitly stating a condition similar or identical to usage (Woods 2001; 
Woods and Irvine 2004). First, Aristotle twice (42a23 and 29) says that premises like 
Γ and Δ in a syllogism Π, Ψ, Γ, Δ ⊦ Θ, where, in fact, Θ follows from Π and Ψ alone, 
are ‘in vain’ (matēn);32 moreover, at 42a39 he says that in these cases ‘more than 
necessary for the [deduction of the, PS] thesis has been taken (pleiō tōn anagkaiōn)’.  
Are these statements, on their own, sufficient for deciding the question 
whether usage is a condition of s-validity? This does not seem to be the case. For, 
both advocates of classical validity and those of non-classical validity can provide 
interpretations of these statements that match their respective views. From a classical 
point of view, a conclusion is validly deduced even if only some of the premises are 
required and others are superfluous: classical validity is monotonic. Advocates of 
non-classical validity, on the other hand, understand the statements as indicating 
precisely the opposite: none of the premises can be superfluous and validity is non-
monotonic. Thus, these statements in isolation cannot decide the question whether 
                                                
31 For an extensive analysis, see Ebert and Nortmann (2007, p. 756-759). 
32 Cf. also I.32, 47a16-9, where Aristotle, in addition to calling premises matēn uses the phrase ti 
periergon to describe them as ‘superfluous’ assumptions.  
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usage is a condition of s-validity. But if we understand I.23 and I.25 as (part of) an 
argument showing that every finite arbitrarily long syllogism is valid if and only if it 
can be analysed into minimal syllogisms (i.e. that analysability into minimal 
syllogisms is a necessary condition for the validity of syllogisms with more terms and 
premises than minimal syllogisms), then we can conclude that usage is a condition of 
s-validity. 
 I will finally turn to chapter II.17, which is concerned with a fallacy 
sometimes called ‘the false-cause fallacy’. Aristotle’s treatment of this fallacy is the 
closest he ever comes to talking explicitly about unused premises; and although the 
chapter is, for this reason, of central importance to the project of this paper, it is 
difficult to establish an unambiguous interpretation for or against the thesis that usage 
is a necessary condition of s-validity. Aristotle distinguishes two principal forms in 
which the fallacy can occur, an obvious and a less obvious one. In the obvious form 
(65b13-21) the individual statements of an argument have no connection (sunechēs) 
whatsoever. In the example Aristotle provides, someone aims to show that the 
diagonal of the square is incommensurable with the sides. In order to do so, he first 
assumes that it is commensurable; he then somehow imports Zeno’s argument that 
motion is impossible; having thus arrived at an impossible conclusion, he claims that 
the original assumption (that the diagonal of the square is commensurable) is false 
and that, hence, its contradictory is true. In the less obvious form (65b21-32) there are 
connections between the individual statements, but the conclusion is not connected 
with the original assumption. 
 Before looking at the second form in more detail (Aristotle does not spend any 
time discussing the first form, and neither will I), it is worth taking note of Aristotle’s 
introductory remarks about the fallacy and its non-significance in direct syllogisms. If 
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something is refuted directly (i.e., I take it, AaB, for instance, is shown to be false by 
a direct syllogism concluding to AoB) by means of the terms A, B, C, it cannot be 
maintained that the syllogism does not depend on the assumption, 
 
because we say that ‘not because of this’ arises when, if this is removed, the 
syllogism is brought to a conclusion just as much (mēden hētton perainētai), 
which is not the case in direct syllogisms (en tois deiktikois); for if the 
assumption is removed, the syllogism related to it (pros tautēn) will not come 
about. Thus it is clear that we say ‘not because of this’ in reductio ad 
impossibile arguments when the original assumption is so related to the 
impossible conclusion that the latter follows just as much (ouden hētton 
sumbainein) both in the case that the assumption is present and in the case that 
it is not present. (65b6-12)   
 
There are two interesting statements in this passage. First, Aristotle seems to say that 
there are never unused premises in direct syllogisms: contrary to false-cause infected 
reductio arguments in which the syllogism comes about after the original assumption 
has been removed, direct syllogisms will not come about if the assumption is 
removed. This sounds like Aristotle is indeed saying that a syllogism of the form Π, 
Ψ, Γ ⊦ Δ is invalid in case Δ follows from Ψ and Γ alone, for clearly, even if we take 
away Π, the conclusion Δ will, in this case, come about. On the other hand, it would 
be surprising if Aristotle were to make such a distinction between direct and indirect 
syllogisms: if he claimed here that a direct syllogism is valid only if the removal of 
any of its premises leads to its invalidity, why would this not likewise and 
immediately apply to indirect syllogisms? Moreover, Aristotle’s explanation why the 
removal of an assumption in a direct syllogism is not possible without the syllogism 
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ceasing to reach its conclusion, is curiously phrased as ‘the syllogism relating to the 
assumption (pros tautēn]) [i.e. the one which was removed, PS] will not come about’ 
(65b8-9). Obviously this is true: if an assumption is removed, the conclusion of the 
syllogism cannot relate to the assumption; but what is perplexing is that, as we will 
see, the same is true for indirect syllogisms and, hence, it does not seem to be a good 
criterion by which to distinguish between direct and indirect syllogisms. I think that, 
in the face of the problems and uncertainties of this passage, we are not entitled to 
count it as evidence for or against usage as a condition of s-validity. 
 The second remarkable feature of this passage is Aristotle’s usage of the 
phrases ‘ouden hētton’ or ‘mēden hētton’, which I translated ‘just as much’. Aristotle 
says five times that a certain conclusion follows (sumbainein) ‘just as much’ whether 
a certain assumption is present or not (65b7, 65b12, 65b27, 65b31 and 66a8). If this is 
interpreted as saying that the syllogism Π, Ψ, Γ ⊦ Δ is valid even if Δ in fact follows 
from Ψ and Γ alone, then this passage could be counted as evidence for Aristotle’s 
acceptance of monotonicity. Concluding that the syllogistic is monotonic would, of 
course, decide the question whether or not the syllogistic is a relevance logic, for 
monotonicity is incompatible with usage and hence with a necessary condition of 
relevance logic. If the ‘ouden hētton’ or ‘mēden hētton’ is not an indication of 
monotonicity, how else can we understand it? I think it is not impossible that all 
Aristotle is trying to show by using this phrase is that a given conclusion requires 
fewer premises than actually stated, i.e. the conclusion does not need a certain 
premise or a number of premises. It would not be unnatural to point out to someone 
that his argument does not rely on a certain premise by saying ‘your conclusion will 
also (or just as much) come about if you remove that premise’ without thereby 
subscribing to monotonicity.  
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 I will now turn to the non-obvious kind of fallacy (65b21-32). The sort of 
syllogism Aristotle has in mind for this form is AB, BC, CD ⊦ BD, where BD is 
impossible or absurd and it is hence concluded that AB is false; the problem with this 
syllogism is that BD follows from BC and CD and that therefore, although we have a 
connection to the first premise via the term B, we should not be able to conclude that 
AB is false, but, assuming that BD is indeed impossible and CD is true, that it is BC 
which has been shown to be false. Aristotle’s response to this problem is the 
following: 
 
But the impossibility must (dei) be connected to the original terms, for in this 
way it will be because of (dia) the assumption, e.g. in the downwards 
direction, taking something connected to the term which is predicated; for if it 
is impossible that A belongs to D, then when A is removed, the falsity will no 
longer exist. (65b32-6) 
 
First, we should note that in his description of AB, BC, CD ⊦ BD Aristotle twice says 
that the conclusion does not follow because of the assumption (mē mentoi di’ ekeinēn 
sumbainoi, 65b22 and ouk an eiē dia tēn ex archēs hupothesin, 65b27) while here, 
considering the, in Aristotle’s opinion, properly connected syllogism AB, BC, CD ⊦ 
AD he says that the conclusion does come about because of (dia) the assumption.  
AB, BC, CD ⊦ AD, therefore, is said to comply with the definition of the syllogism 
(in particular, with its dia-condition), while AB, BC, CD ⊦ BD is said not to comply 
with it. Moreover, Aristotle explains why, in the latter case but not in the former, the 
conclusion comes about because of the assumption: if the conclusion were to come 
about because of the assumption, then a removal of the assumption should have an 
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effect on the coming about of the conclusion; or, in other words, if the conclusion 
depends on a certain set of assumptions, then a change in this set should have an 
effect on the conclusion, but if it does not depend on it, no effect is to be expected. 
The phrasing and the explanation might be seen as a reference to the definition of the 
syllogism, which demanded that the conclusion ‘follows because of (dia sumbainein)’ 
the premises; if this is indeed the case, we would have reason to reject the s-validity 
of AB, BC, CD ⊦ BD while accepting that of AB, BC, CD ⊦ AD.  
 The results of Aristotle’s arguments in chapters I.23 and I.25, would, if 
correct, allow us to give a more formal explanation of the invalidity of the former and 
the validity of the latter syllogism. For, if we accept that analysability into minimal 
syllogisms is a necessary condition for the validity of non-minimal syllogisms, we 
have a criterion by which to judge the two syllogisms in question: for, while the latter 
syllogism is analysable, the former is not. The analysis, in order to be a proper 
analysis, has to satisfy the following two conditions: first, that the non-minimal 
syllogism and the minimal syllogisms terminate in the same conclusion; and 
secondly, that each premise of the non-minimal syllogism will appear in at least one 
minimal syllogism (consequently, all terms appearing in the non-minimal syllogism 
will also appear in the minimal syllogisms). The second part of the criterion (i.e. that 
the premises and, as a consequence, the terms of the non-minimal syllogism have to 
reappear in the minimal syllogisms) seems to be a reasonable demand if the process is 
to be a real analysis. For if it were the case that the minimal syllogisms would lack a 
premise that does appear in the non-minimal syllogism, then a synthesis of the 
minimal syllogisms into the non-minimal syllogism would require the addition of a 
premise from, as it were, outside. Likewise, the minimal syllogisms cannot be 
understood as an analysis of the non-minimal syllogism if the non-minimal syllogism 
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contains an element that does not appear in the minimal syllogisms or is not derivable 
from the minimal syllogisms.  
However, this might give rise to the objection that the argument is circular. 
For, one might think that the second part of the criterion demands that the premises 
and terms are used; hence, it would not be the structural features of the minimal 
syllogism that enforce usage (and through which the non-minimal syllogism also 
satisfies the usage-condition); rather it would be the second part of the criterion of the 
process of transformation that enforces usage. This objection can be met by pointing 
to the difference between usage and appearance. The second part of the criterion of 
analysis does not demand that the premises are used, but merely that they reappear. 
This is not just a change of words to avoid the looming circularity. As we have seen 
in the discussion of modern relevance logic and its proponents’ complaints about 
some classically valid deductions, the mere appearance of a premise in itself says 
nothing about its being used or not. Therefore, the demand that a premise has to 
reappear in the process of an analysis also goes no way towards establishing that this 
premise is actually used in deriving the conclusion.  
 Returning to the two syllogisms under consideration, AB, BC, CD ⊦ BD and 
AB, BC, CD ⊦ AD, let us suppose that each individual pair of terms is connected with 
an a-predicate, so that we get the following two syllogisms: (i) AaB, BaC, CaD ⊦ 
BaD and (ii) AaB, BaC, CaD ⊦ AaD, both of which, we note, have the same 
premises, but different conclusions. If analysability into minimal syllogisms is a 
condition of s-validity, and since Aristotle seems to reject (i) while he accepts (ii), we 
should expect the analysis of (i) into minimal syllogisms to fail at least one of the two 
parts of the criterion for successful analyses outlined above. Syllogism (ii), on the 
other hand, should satisfy the criterion, and indeed it does. For if we analyse (ii) into 
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the minimal syllogisms AaB, BaC ⊦ AaC; AaC, CaD ⊦ AaD, it is clear that, first, the 
final conclusion of these two minimal syllogisms is identical with the conclusion of 
the non-minimal syllogism and, secondly, that each and every premise of the non-
minimal syllogism reappears in the minimal syllogisms. A transformation of (i) into 
minimals would, on the other hand, yield: AaB, BaC ⊦ AaC; AaC, CaD ⊦ AaD. This 
time, the criterion for a proper analysis is not satisfied because the final conclusion of 
the minimal syllogisms (AaD) is not identical with the conclusion of the non-minimal 
syllogism (BaD). Therefore, if analysability is a condition of s-validity, we can reject 
(i) but keep (ii).33  
It therefore seems that Aristotle recognized the danger unused premises can 
pose in the context of indirect arguments and that his previous analysis provides him 
with the formal means to fend off this danger and declare syllogisms with unused 
premises invalid. At the same time, he does not explicitly resort to the analysis of 
chapter I.23 and I.25 in order to do so, but it does not seem implausible that his 
remark that some conclusions come about ‘because of’ the assumptions while others 
only seem to do so, is supposed to lead in that direction; for we have seen that this 
element, originally introduced in the definition of the syllogism, played a crucial role 
in the analysis of I.23 and I.25 as well, where the ‘because-of’-condition is spelled 
out. 
                                                
33 Analysability is an answer (or part of an answer) to the question: what makes a complex argument 
valid? In natural deduction systems, in order to show that a complex argument is valid, it is necessary 
to show that each step of the argument is sanctioned by rules of which we know that they preserve 
validity. Analysis allows us to reduce a complex argument into simpler parts of which we know that 
they preserve validity. It is minimal syllogisms for which Aristotle shows whether or not they are s-
valid and it is the structure of the minimal syllogism for which he presents an argument concerning the 
conditions of its s-validity. Clearly, he needs some formal way of linking the simple parts (the s-
validity of which he presents an argument for) with more complex arguments, the possible s-validity of 
which he accepts. It should be noted that analysability is not an alternative to a natural deduction 
system (or, for that matter, to an axiomatic system), but rather a different way to express the same 
underlying idea. 
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4. S-validity and validity 
We can summarize our evaluation up to this point as follows. It seems that Aristotle 
lays down a general description of s-validity in his definition of the syllogism. With 
this definition in the background he first investigates a set of syllogisms structured in 
the way I have called ‘minimal’. He establishes which syllogisms in this set are valid 
and establishes dependence relations between them (i.e. the dependence of the second 
and third figure on the first, and in particular on the two universal moods of the first 
figure). Aristotle then tries to show that the initial set of syllogisms was no arbitrary 
choice, but that the structural characteristics of the syllogisms of this set – three 
distinct terms distributed over two premises such that one term appears in both 
premises – are both the minimal requirements for a conclusion to come about (i.e. no 
conclusion can come about if a syllogism has fewer than two premises or fewer than 
three distinct terms or no middle term) as well the maximally necessary requirements 
for any given conclusion to come about (i.e. there is no conclusion that requires more 
than two premises or three distinct terms). This proof entails that any valid syllogism 
will satisfy letter-sharing; also, at least inasmuch as minimal syllogisms are 
concerned, usage has likewise been shown to be a necessary condition. Aristotle’s 
subsequent arguments, moreover, suggest that Aristotle makes the validity of non-
minimal syllogisms dependent on minimal syllogisms (and eventually, of course, on 
the perfect syllogisms), which allowed us to extend the scope of the necessity of 
usage from minimal to non-minimal syllogisms. Finally, Aristotle’s treatment of the 
false-cause fallacy turned out less clear than desirable in either direction. Aristotle 
directly discusses the crucial case of unused premises, but does not explicitly refer to 
the formal solution that would have been available to him if my interpretation is 
correct. His mention of the crucial ‘because of the assumptions’-element of the 
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definition of the syllogism, however, might be seen as an indication in that direction. 
For, it is this element that, at least in part, drives his argument that leads to the thesis 
that the validity of non-minimal syllogisms depends on that of minimal syllogisms. It 
appears, therefore, that Aristotle’s syllogistic satisfies the letter-sharing condition as 
well as the usage condition.  
Contrary to modern relevance logic, usage is not a sufficient condition for s-
validity, for the syllogisms shown to be invalid in I.4-6 also belong to the set whose 
defining characteristics allowed us to show that usage is a necessary condition. 
However, although usage is a not a sufficient condition for s-validity, it is a sufficient 
condition for letter-sharing: any syllogisms that satisfy usage will also satisfy letter-
sharing. Letter-sharing, on the other hand, does not entail usage: in syllogisms such 
as AB, BC, CD ⊦ BD the set of premises and the conclusion share letters, but they do 
not satisfy the usage condition. 
 We have reason to believe, therefore, that the syllogistic displays good 
approximations to the constraints imposed in modern relevance logic. This in itself is 
an interesting result; but in order to proceed to the claim that the syllogistic is a 
relevance logic à la Anderson and Belnap, it is necessary to consider the evidence for 
and against the thesis that s-validity is, for Aristotle, merely a subproperty of validity, 
or, on the other hand, identical with validity. For, as we have seen in the presentation 
of modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap urge that relevance is a condition of 
validity itself. If Aristotle accepted non-syllogistic arguments as valid, the possibility 
arises that relevance is not a condition of validity itself, but only of s-validity, since 
up to now we have only presented an argument that shows that syllogisms impose 
relevance-conditions. At the beginning of section 3, I introduced two different views 
on this issue: the A-view states that Aristotle did accept arguments different from 
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syllogisms as formally valid. One version of the A-view refrains from spelling out 
what this notion of validity amounted to and is content to take validity as an 
unanalysed primitive, while a second version states that Aristotle’s validity must be 
classical validity. The B-view, on the other hand, claims that (only) s-validity is 
validity for Aristotle.  
I submit that I take the B-view to be the more natural view, and that if we are 
unable to find pressing evidence in favour of the A-view, we should maintain the B-
view. The reason for this is twofold: first, Aristotle shows great interest in s-validity 
and he carefully investigates this notion. If he accepted a more general validity, it is 
highly perplexing that he undertook no attempts to investigate it as well. Secondly, it 
appears that ancient and medieval authors did not even consider that Aristotle 
accepted a validity different from s-validity. This can be seen, for instance, in these 
authors’ presentations of the order of the Organon: the Categories are understood as 
investigating words, the De Interpretatione as investigating propositions, the Prior 
Analytics as investigating syllogisms and the Posterior Analytics as investigating 
demonstrations. The ancient authors understand the Organon to be complete, i.e. there 
is no gap between the De Interpretatione and the Prior Analytics, which would be the 
place where a more general notion of logical consequence would be investigated in 
this order.34 Even 19th century commentators like Waitz (1844) do not appear to 
assent to the A-view. Only in the post Frege-Russel-Whitehead period, i.e. in the 
period characterised by the acceptance of classical validity as the Official view, do we 
find scholars who clearly and unequivocally embrace the A-view. This should make 
                                                
34 For presentations of the order of the Organon see, for instance, Simplicius, in Cat., 14,33-15.8 or 
David the Invincible, Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, II,2-3. Due to the nature of the 
transmission of Stoic views, it is difficult to determine the latter’s position regarding our present 
question, but it has been observed (Sorabji 2005, p. 250) that the Stoics and the Aristotelians rejected 
each other’s examples of valid arguments. This, however, is not specific enough for our purposes. 
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us alert to the possibility that the A-view is anachronistic. To be sure, none of the 
points just mentioned can count as conclusive evidence in favour of the B-view. But, I 
think, it shifts the burden of proof to the advocates of the A-view. 
 The most general kind of argument that could be made in favour of the A-
view is derived from various examples of arguments Aristotle makes and which he 
apparently regarded as valid, although they are not syllogisms, for instance because 
they have only one premise. This kind of evidence is, in my view, generally 
inconclusive, for just as it is common practice nowadays not to formalize each and 
every argument in order to make obvious any required derivations and to explicitly 
state all required premises, Aristotle also might have followed this practice.35 We 
have to take into account the possibility that Aristotle believed that these arguments 
could be shown to be formally valid by turning them into proper syllogisms – even if 
this is factually wrong. For instance, it has been noted many times that the theory of 
the syllogism cannot account for the mathematics of even Aristotle’s time (Mueller 
1974, p. 37); yet Aristotle seems to be convinced of the contrary.36 Some non-
syllogistic arguments that Aristotle appears to accept as valid might allow for a 
transformation into syllogistic form and Aristotle might have accepted them as valid 
for precisely this reason. Other arguments do not allow for such a transformation, but 
Aristotle might still have believed that they can be transformed. Thus, it will not be 
possible to make a conclusive argument in favour of the A-view by appeal to 
examples of non-syllogistic arguments that can be found in the Aristotelian corpus. 
Secondly, Frede has suggested that the definition of the syllogism itself can be 
seen to contain a distinction between validity and s-validity. According to Frede, the 
                                                
35 We will see below how Alexander employs this thought in his commentary on Prior Analytics I.32, 
an important chapter for the issue under consideration. 
36 Cf. APo I.14, 79a17-32. See Mendell (1998). 
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definition comprises two parts: the first part – ‘sullogismos de esti logos en hōi 
tethentōn tinōn heteron ti tōn keimenōn ex anagkēs’ (24b18-20) – defines ‘a class, or 
the class, of valid inferences’, while the second part – ‘(sumbainei) tōi tauta einai’ 
(24b19-20) – ‘serves to single out those valid inferences which are syllogisms’. 
(Frede 1974, p. 20) This interpretation is untenable. Anything but reading the 
definition as a definition of a single thing, syllogismos (irrespective whether the word 
is understood to signify ‘syllogism’ or ‘valid argument’), and the conditions as 
conditions of a single thing, violates the clear meaning of the Greek and requires an 
elliptical reading that already assumes that the A-view is correct. 
Thirdly, the strongest direct textual evidence for the A-view can probably be 
found in Prior Analytics I.32. In this chapter, Aristotle appears to be making a 
distinction between ‘following syllogistically’ and ‘following necessarily’ – a 
distinction that appears to match that of s-validity and validity. The two sentences 
from which such a view could be construed are almost identical in phrasing. In the 
first Aristotle says that ‘some [arguments] seem to syllogize (dokousi sullogizesthai) 
because of the necessary following (dia to anagkaion ti sumbainein) from the 
assumptions’ (47a23-4). Since some arguments merely seem to be syllogisms, we can 
confuse them with proper syllogisms, and we do so, as Aristotle explains in the 
second passage, ‘because of the necessary following of something (dia to anagkaion 
ti sumbainein) from the assumptions, because syllogisms are also necessary’ (47a32-
3). Moreover, he says that ‘necessity (to anagkaion) is wider than syllogism, for every 
syllogism is necessary, but not every necessity is a syllogism’ (47a33-5). Since 
Aristotle seems to be saying, therefore, that there is a kind of logical consequence 
although this consequence is not syllogistic, it appears that Aristotle recognised a 
validity different from s-validity. 
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 The evidence for the A-view that can be gathered from a reading of this 
chapter indeed appears strong. But I do not think it conclusive. First, the fact alone 
that Aristotle thinks that necessity has a wider scope than syllogistic necessity comes 
as no surprise if we consult Metaphysics Δ, where Aristotle distinguishes several 
kinds of necessity, some of which have nothing to do with logic.37 Further, the 
Posterior Analytics, and especially chapter I.4 of that work, give the impression that 
Aristotle recognised a kind of necessity that is not syllogistic. Neither, however, does 
this necessity come from a different kind of logical derivation. It is not the necessity 
of a logical consequence Aristotle is talking about when he discusses the nature of the 
principles of demonstrations, but rather the necessity of a proposition that flows 
directly from an essential relation that is expressed in that proposition.38 The 
confusion Aristotle is pointing to, then, could arise because of the fact that the 
conclusion is a necessary proposition although the necessity of that proposition is not 
that of logical consequence. Although this interpretation is, I think, possible, it 
requires us to read the phrase ‘sumbainein ek tōn keimenōn’ in an artificial way that 
differs from other occurrences of this phrase in the Prior Analytics. In this reading the 
phrase would not mean, as it does elsewhere, ‘follow from the assumptions’, but 
‘follow after/upon the assumptions’, i.e. the conclusion simply appears sequentially 
after the assumptions, although it does not follow from them. This latter meaning of 
the Greek preposition ek is normal, yet we do not find it elsewhere in the logical 
works. 
                                                
37 Met. Δ V, 1015a20-b15. 
38 Cf. APo I.4, 73a21-b5. The fact that the necessity of the principles of demonstrations is not the 
necessity of logical consequence has nothing to do with the difference between syllogism and 
demonstration. It is, of course, possible to set up a syllogism that has as its conclusion a proposition 
that could serve as a principle in a demonstration. But the logical necessity this proposition receives 
from the fact that it is a conclusion of a valid argument is not the necessity that makes the proposition 
suitable for a demonstration. The kind of necessity that allows us to use a proposition as a principle in a 
demonstration cannot be, as Aristotle points out several times in the Posterior Analytics, that of a 
logical consequence. 
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 A different and, in my opinion, more plausible explanation of Aristotle’s 
meaning in I.32 can be found in the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
Alexander shows an awareness of the issue under consideration when he notes that 
some readers might ask themselves how Aristotle’s seeming acknowledgement of 
arguments in which something follows necessarily from the assumptions although 
these arguments are not syllogisms, relates to the definition of the syllogism (350,11-
8.). His answer is based on the ‘because-of’ condition of the definition of the 
syllogism. Contrary to Frede’s interpretation, however, Alexander does not arrive at 
the conclusion that Aristotle distinguished between validity and s-validity; rather, the 
non-syllogistic arguments Aristotle refers to have, in Alexander’s reading, the status 
of enthymemes.  
 Alexander’s interpretation takes its cue from Aristotle’s introduction of the 
chapter, in which Aristotle announces that we need to understand how syllogisms are 
led back into the figures (46b40-47a2). In order to successfully complete this task, we 
must be alert to the possibility that ‘both in writing and in conversation’ premises can 
be omitted or unnecessarily stated.39 Neglecting these possibilities and taking the 
premises of an argument at face value will make this task impossible (47a21-2). We 
must, then, investigate the ‘inadequacy’ (to endees, 47a22) of arguments that results 
through the aforementioned omissions and superfluous additions. Alexander dedicates 
multiple pages (341-9) to a detailed interpretation of Aristotle’s examples, which, 
although interesting in itself, cannot be reproduced here in detail. It will suffice to 
point out a few crucial passages. 
                                                
39 I.32, 47a14-8. Aristotle in particular mentions the following cases: (ia) stating a universal premise 
but omitting to state the premise contained in it; (ib) stating a premise, but omitting the premises from 
which they are derived; (ii) asking for superfluous premises. 
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 The problem Alexander detects in Aristotle’s examples is the omission of 
premises. It is interesting to see what status these premises have. According to 
Alexander, we need to purge from arguments what is superfluous and add what is 
necessary until ‘we reach and discover the two premises for the conclusion in the 
strict sense (tas duo protaseis tas tou sumperasmatos kurias, 343,31-2)’. Alexander, 
then, does not seem to accept that the arguments as stated are valid; rather, if we do 
not add what is necessary and hence reveal the premises in a strict sense (tas kurias 
protaseis) the argument is fallacious. That Alexander is not merely talking about s-
invalidity becomes clear from two passages of his commentary: first, throughout the 
commentary of I.32 Alexander interprets to endees not as ‘inadequacy with respect to 
syllogisms’ but as ‘fallacious argument’ (i.e., invalid argument);40 and secondly, 
explaining Aristotle’s first example (destruction of substances) he says: ‘the 
conclusion is not the result of the assumed sequence [of the argument], but [follows] 
because of the fact that the universal premise, which we added, is true […]’ (348,2-3). 
But if Alexander is right and the arguments as stated are fallacious, why does 
Aristotle say that in them something follows necessarily from the assumptions? 
Alexander’s answer is slightly different for the different cases he considers, but there 
is a common core in all of them: there is an omitted premise, which is true; and the 
addition of this premise makes the argument valid. Of course, not every argument that 
omits a premise would fall into the category of arguments that are not valid as stated, 
but nevertheless have a conclusion that follows, in this special way, ‘necessarily from 
the assumptions’. The special case is rather characterised by the fact that the omitted 
premise is either a very obvious truth (as in the case of the axiom ‘things equal to the 
                                                
40 Alexander understands to endees not merely as inadequacy with respect to syllogisms, but as ‘error’ 
or ‘failure’ of arguments in general. Glossing 47a22 he says: rhaion to phōrasai tēn kata tous logous 
hamartian (346,26). 
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same things will be equal to each other’, 344,17), or is ‘equal in power’ (isodunamos) 
to the premise that would be required for the argument to be valid strictly speaking. It 
is not entirely clear what Alexander means by the term isodunamos, but the most 
important feature of premises that are isodunama seems to be that they can be 
transformed (metalambanesthai) into or that they indicate the substitution of the 
required premise.41  
Alexander proceeds to formulate a general explanation of the distinction 
between the two kinds of arguments and establishes a link to the definition of the 
syllogism. The word tethentōn (posited) in the definition should be understood as 
‘assumed to be or not be’, i.e. stated explicitly in the way proper for syllogistic 
premises and not as ‘hypothesized’ (hupotethentōn), which, if we take into account 
Alexander’s interpretation outline above, should be understood as ‘somehow 
contained or indicated’ by the premises or as ‘covertly assumed’ due to obviousness. 
Before trying to lead an argument back into one of the syllogistic figures, a process 
the chapter begins to investigate, one therefore has to find ‘the conclusions' premises 
in the strict sense’ (tas kurias tou sumperasmatos protaseis). 
Therefore, Alexander does not read I.32 as an indication that Aristotle 
accepted a sort of logical consequence different from that of syllogistic consequence 
and hence as an acceptance of a validity different from s-validity. Although there are 
questions regarding the details of his interpretation (e.g., how to understand the term 
isodunamos), his general line of interpretation cannot easily be rejected. The idea that 
Aristotle is making a difference between arguments that are formally valid as stated 
and arguments that, although they are not valid in this sense, are still accepted as valid 
                                                
41 Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of enthymemes in II.27, where Aristotle explicitly says that in enthymemes 
some premises are not stated (ou legousi) while others are formally assumed (lambanousin), 70a19-20. 
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in an everyday context certainly has a foothold in Aristotle’s characterisation of the 
latter arguments as ‘in writing and in conversation’ (47a16). Hence, even if 
Alexander’s argument is not accepted as conclusive, the A-view can certainly not be 
established by reference to I.32.42 
Before we leave I.32, it is worth noting an interesting feature in Aristotle’s 
choice of phrasing. Aristotle has several ways to signify logical consequence. The two 
most common ones in the Prior Analytics are ex anagkēs sumbainei (‘it follows from 
necessity’) and anagkē esti (‘it is necessary’); a few times he also uses sumbainei/ 
gignetai anagkaion (‘necessity follows/ comes about’).43 Aristotle’s description of the 
non-syllogistic arguments in I.32, on the other hand, features a phrase that is unique in 
the Prior Analytics: to anagkaion ti sumbainein. With Alexander’s interpretation in 
the background, it is very tempting to try and understand the tis as modifying 
anagkaion and create the same etiolated sense which Burnyeat (2002, p. 36-7) argued 
paschein ti and alloiōsis tis have in De Anima 410a25 and 416b33. The Greek of our 
passage does not allow for such a reading, as tis has a different grammatical function 
(in De Anima it modifies a noun, here it governs an adjective). Nevertheless, it is hard 
to deny that Aristotle’s phrasing is much vaguer than if he had used his usual ex 
anagkēs sumbainei or anagkē esti – a vagueness that might well be thought of as 
indicative of the distinction Alexander draws between syllogistic arguments and the 
arguments discussed in I.32. 
                                                
42 The idea that Aristotle’s remark about necessary non-syllogistic arguments can be explained by 
distinguishing between ‘necessary as stated’ and ‘necessary because of additionally assumed premises’ 
can also be found in Striker (2009, pp. 214-5) and Crubellier (2014, p. 300). 
43 It is remarkable, however, that sumbainei/ gignetai anagkaion always seems to be used in sentences 
with negations signifying that the case under investigation does not allow for a logical consequence to 
be derived. Cf. 26a4-5; 26a7-8; 27a16-8; 27a25; 29a19-21. 
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Finally, I want to consider three passages, which, I think, contain evidence for 
the B-view and against the A-view. The first passage is part of the introductory 
paragraph of II.23: 
 
We must now say that not only the dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms 
come about through the figures (schēmatōn) that we have described before, 
but also the rhetorical ones and simply any form of conviction whatsoever 
(haplōs hētisoun pistis), i.e. a conviction in accordance with whatever kind of 
inquiry. For everything we believe (hapanta gar pisteuomen) is either through 
syllogism or through induction. (68b9-14) 
 
In order to have a correct grasp of the weight and scope of Aristotle’s claim, we 
should first observe the context. II.23 begins the last section of the Prior Analytics, 
which continues all through to II.27 (cf. Smith 1989, p. 219). In this section, Aristotle 
attempts to put the technical theory of syllogisms, which he developed up to this 
point, in relation with different forms of creating convictions, for instance, induction 
and enthymemes. He argues that all these different forms of creating convictions rely 
on the technical syllogism. Enthymemes are a kind of rhetorical syllogism and they 
are characterised by the fact that a premise is missing. As such (i.e. as stated), the 
conclusion of an enthymeme is not logically necessary; but if the missing premise is 
in fact true and known, the enthymeme has a conviction-creating power and we might 
even say that the conclusion is a necessary consequence, because we assume the 
omitted premise. If we assume (lambanousin, 70a20) the omitted premise, i.e. if we 
disregard whether or not it is explicitly stated (legousi, 70a19), we end up with a 
technical and valid syllogism. Aristotle’s theory of induction is a complicated matter 
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and cannot be discussed here in detail. II.23, however, clearly gives the impression 
that Aristotle thinks it also relies on technical syllogisms.44  
This leads Aristotle to make the very comprehensive claim that any conviction 
or belief comes about either through syllogism or through induction. It is clear that 
syllogismos here means ‘syllogism’ and not ‘argument’ (i.e. a more general notion 
comprising syllogisms and other valid arguments), for he explicitly links the word 
with the figures (schēmata). Moreover, if syllogismos would mean ‘argument’ it is 
difficult to see why he juxtaposes it with ‘induction’, if it is assumed that inductions 
are a kind of argument.45 It appears to me, therefore, that the beginning of II.23 
presents strong evidence for the view that Aristotle did not think of a kind of valid 
argument different from the syllogism and that he therefore equates s-validity with 
validity. The only way I see to make II.23 compatible with the A-view would be to 
understand Aristotle as saying that syllogisms and induction are only sufficient to 
bring about convictions of any kind but that arguments different from syllogisms 
might also be able to bring about some or all kinds of convictions. There is, however, 
nothing in the text that would suggest such a construal. 
Secondly, one passage of Aristotle’s discussion of enthymemes might be of 
interest with respect to the question whether the A- or the B-view is more appropriate. 
I have already mentioned the fact that in this discussion Aristotle distinguishes 
between explicitly stating a premise and ‘not saying’ (ou legein) but assuming it. 
After these remarks, Aristotle makes a statement regarding the effect and status of an 
enthymeme as contrasted with a proper syllogism:  
 
                                                
44 68b15-37. Cf. also McKirahan (1983). 
45 The difference between syllogism and induction is explained in 68b30-37. This explanation does not 
create problems for the claim that inductions rely on syllogisms, but it is difficult to make sense of it if 
syllogismos is understood as ‘argument’. 
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When only one premise is assumed, only a sign will come about (sēmeion 
gignetai monon), but when the other [premise] is also assumed, a sullogismos 
[will come about]. (70a24-5) 
 
Aristotle contrasts sēmeion and syllogismos on the grounds of the number of premises 
explicitly stated: if both premises are stated, we will have a sullogismos; if only one 
premise is stated, we will only have a sign.46 A sign, clearly, is weaker than a 
necessity and, hence, it seems justified to conclude that enthymemes in themselves 
(i.e. without additionally assuming the omitted premise) do not bring about a logical 
consequence and are strictly speaking invalid. More importantly, this passage is 
problematic for a claim that is sometimes made in connection with the A-view, 
namely that Aristotle regarded as valid one particular kind of non-syllogistic 
argument, i.e. arguments with only one premise (Frede 1974, p. 21). We have to ask 
ourselves, then, why a syllogism with one premise would not entail a logical 
consequence but only a sign while another kind of argument with one premise would 
bring about a logical consequence. If the A-view is spelled out such that Aristotle 
accepted a kind of propositional logic, there does not seem to be a plausible answer to 
this question, for a syllogistic premise is as good a proposition as any other. 
 Thirdly, and finally, a passage we have already discussed, I.23, can be referred 
to in favour of the B-view. Discussing the argument AC ⊦ AB (i.e. an argument with 
only one premise), Aristotle states that we need to assume another premise AX or CX 
or otherwise we will not have a syllogism. Explaining why this is the case he says: 
‘for (gar) nothing follows necessarily (ouden sumbainei ex anagkēs) from the 
                                                
46 Aristotle contrasts sēmeion (sign or indication) with syllogismos. A syllogismos can, of course, be an 
argument; sēmeion, on the other hand, can hardly signify ‘argument’. But if we understand the words 
to signify the outcome of an argument and sēmeion is ‘sign’ or ‘indication’, syllogismos should be 
‘consequence’. This is close to Smith’s suggestion to understand syllogismos as ‘deduction’. 
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assumption that something is said of something’ (40b35-6). It is important to observe 
the precise chain of reasoning Aristotle presents us with. He first concludes that the 
single premise AC will not yield a syllogism. He then, as is regularly the case in 
Aristotle, provides the reason for the conclusion, namely that ‘nothing will follow 
necessarily’ from the assumption. The reason Aristotle provides is sufficient if we 
read it against the background of the definition of the syllogism: having a necessary 
consequence is a necessary condition of valid syllogisms and, hence, if an argument 
fails to satisfy this condition, we are entitled to conclude that this argument cannot be 
a valid syllogism. But what reasons are there to justify Aristotle’s claim that nothing 
follows necessarily from the single premise AC? As I have argued above, there is a 
reason justifying this claim. This reason, however, is intrinsic to the theory of the 
syllogism and does not straightforwardly apply to logics different from the syllogistic. 
If Aristotle believed that the only kind of formally valid argument is the syllogism, his 
claim that nothing follows necessarily from a single premise AC can be sufficiently 
accounted for by the reasoning outlined in section 3. But if he believed that there is 
another kind of formally valid argument, then the claim that nothing follows 
necessarily from the single premise AC cannot be accounted for by constructing an 
argument based on statements Aristotle makes in the Prior Analytics. If the B-view is 
correct, Aristotle’s argument at 40b35-6 is clear; under the A-view, however, it is not 
as clear how the argument should be understood.  
 
 To sum up: the evidence in favour of the A-view is certainly not conclusive. 
The most important passage that is supposed to corroborate this view, chapter I.32, 
can indeed be read in such a way. But, I think, it cannot be denied that Alexander’s 
interpretation is also possible and that there are passages in Aristotle’s text that 
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indicate such an interpretation. Moreover, Aristotle’s aim to show that other kinds of 
arguments, such as enthymemes and inductions, ultimately rely on syllogisms or even 
have to be converted into syllogisms in order to be valid can be seen as strong 
evidence in favour of the B-view. To be sure, problems remain in Aristotle’s 
syllogistic theory if we adopt the B-view (for instance, the status of conversions and 
hypothetical syllogisms). These problems might disappear if we adopt the A-view, but 
in the face of the textual evidence I do not see any justification for doing so. In my 
view, the fact alone that problems disappear from Aristotle’s theory if we ascribe a 
notion to him which he never unequivocally embraces – let alone attempts to analyse 
– stretches the principle of charity too far. 
 I take the evidence for the B-view, then, to be more compelling. Moreover, 
given the textual situation, an adoption of the B-view is suggested by a principle of 
prudence with regard to historical texts. Even so, I do not think that the argument 
against the A-view and for the B-view is conclusive.47 Hence, I will end on a 
conditional note: if my argument for the B-view and against the A-view has been 
convincing, nothing stands in the way of proceeding to the conclusion that Aristotle’s 
syllogistic is a relevance logic: s-validity has been shown to have good 
approximations with the conditions laid out in modern relevance logic à la Anderson 
and Belnap and if the B-view is correct then s-validity is the only validity Aristotle 
accepts. Therefore, the conditions of s-validity are conditions of validity. If, on the 
other hand, the A-view is still seen as more convincing, this conclusion is not 
possible: the syllogistic satisfies the appropriate relevance conditions, but since these 
conditions are formulated as conditions of s-validity and modern relevance logic 
                                                
47 Given the nature of the A-view, which ascribes to Aristotle a notion of validity as an unanalysed 
primitive, and the Aristotelian texts we have, it is doubtful whether a conclusive argument against the 
A-view can be made at all. It is hard to argue against a view, when it is based in part on the idea that 
there is no textual evidence for what it claims. 
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demands them to be conditions of validity, Aristotle’s syllogistic does not satisfy 
Anderson and Belnap’s most fundamental requirement. Of course, it might still be 
possible that Aristotle thought that the more general notion of validity also satisfied 
relevance conditions. Yet, since he never analyses anything but s-validity, there is no 
way to investigate this thesis. 
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